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I. INTRODUCTIONDURING this Survey period, courts addressed various important
issues related to Texas insurance law, including the effect of no-
tice provisions in claims-made policies, the scope of certain "bus-
iness risk" exclusions in commercial general liability (CGL) policies, and
the scope of standard appraisal clauses that appear in most property poli-
cies. Additionally, courts continued to interpret and apply holdings from
recent Texas Supreme Court cases relating to the "property damage" cov-
erage trigger, reimbursement rights between co-insurers, and exceptions
to the "eight-corners" rule when determining an insurer's duty to defend.
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During this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court issued two signifi-
cant decisions in cases of first impression concerning the consequences of
an insured's failure to provide timely notice in compliance with a notice
condition under a claims-made policy. For over twenty years, the law in
Texas has been evolving regarding the effect of an insured's failure to
comply with a condition precedent requiring notice of a claim or suit "as
soon as practicable." In 1972, the Texas Supreme Court held in Members
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Cutaia that a notice provision in an automobile
policy was a condition precedent to coverage, regardless of whether the
insurer was harmed or prejudiced by the late notice.' The supreme court
recognized the "apparent injustice" created but nonetheless relied upon
the "plain wording of the contract" in making its determination. 2 In re-
sponse to Cutaia, the State Board of Insurance (THE Board) issued an
order requiring that insurers include a mandatory endorsement in Texas
general liability and automobile policies that an insured's failure to pro-
vide notice does not bar coverage unless the insurer has been prejudiced.3
Given the limited authority of the Board and the decision from Cutaia,
litigation ensued over the next several years regarding whether compa-
nies and policies beyond the reach of the Board's authority were subject
to a prejudice requirement.4 For example, in Hanson Production Co. v.
Americas Insurance Co., a surplus lines carrier denied coverage for its
insured based on late notice.5 The surplus lines carrier argued it was not
required to show prejudice. Although it recognized that Cutaia had not
yet been overruled and that the Board's order did not apply to policies
issued by surplus lines carriers, the Fifth Circuit, relying on Hernandez v.
Gulf Group Lloyds,6 nevertheless opined that that the supreme court
would likely adopt a "uniform rule of construction" and require prejudice
under the circumstances.7 In Hernandez, the supreme court held that an
insurer was required to show prejudice to escape liability on the basis of a
violation of the settlement-without-consent exclusion.8 The supreme
court in Hernandez focused on the fact that when an insurer is not
prejudiced by an insured's breach of the insurance contract, the insurer
should not be relieved of its obligations, because the breach was not ma-
terial and the insurer had not been denied the benefit of the bargain.9
1. 476 S.W.2d 278, 280-81 (Tex. 1972).
2. Id.
3. Tex. State Bd. of Ins., Revision of Texas Standard Provision For General Liability
Policies-Amendatory Endorsement-Notice, Order No. 23080 (Mar. 13, 1973).
4. See, e.g., Hanson Prod. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 108 F.3d 627 (5th Cir. 1997)
(surplus lines policy); Chiles v. Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co., 858 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Tex. App.-
Houston Fist Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (homeowners' policy).
5. Hanson, 108 F.3d at 628.
6. 875 S.W.2d 691, 692, 694 (Tex. 1994).
7. Hanson, 108 F.3d at 630.




In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in PAJ, Inc. v.
Hanover Insurance Co. and definitively answered the question of whether
an insured's failure to provide notice as soon as practicable, in violation
of a notice condition in an occurrence-based liability policy, precludes
coverage in the absence of a showing of prejudice by the insurer.' 0 As
the Fifth Circuit had done in Hanson, the supreme court in PAJ adopted
the Hernandez analysis and focused on the "fundamental principle of
contract law" that an immaterial breach of contract by one party does not
relieve the other party from performance." According to the supreme
court, because the timely notice provision is not an essential part of the
bargained-for exchange in an "occurrence" policy, an insurer must show
prejudice-or that the insured committed a material breach of the pol-
icy-before it can deny coverage.12
In PAJ, the supreme court noted that a key difference between occur-
rence and claims-made policies is that, in occurrence policies, "any notice
requirement is subsidiary to the event that triggers coverage," whereas in
claims-made policies, notice itself constitutes the event that triggers cov-
erage.13 Additionally, the majority in PAJ specifically recognized a dis-
tinction in the effect of a notice provision in an occurrence policy and
claims-made policy, going so far as to criticize the dissent for "focusing on
the type of coverage rather than the type of policy" at issue.14 Thus, the
supreme court left the issue open regarding whether the same no-
tice-prejudice rule would apply in the context of late notice under a
claims-made policy.
NOTICE UNDER A CLAIMS-MADE POLICY
Prior to this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court had not ad-
dressed the issue of late notice under a claims-made policy. However,
other Texas federal and state courts had nearly uniformly held that an
insurer need not show prejudice to deny coverage based on late notice
under a claims-made policy.' 5 Particularly, in Federal Insurance Co. v.
10. 243 S.W.3d 630, 636-37 (Tex. 2008).
11. Id. at 634 (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex.
1994)).
12. Id. at 633, 636-37.
13. See generally id. at 636 (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines
Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 653, 658 (5th Cir. 1999); Hirsch v. Tex. Lawyers' Ins. Exch., 808 S.W.2d
561, 563 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied)).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Singleentry.com, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 117 F. App'x 933,
936 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting the distinction in occurrence and claims-made policies and that
insurers need not show prejudice to deny coverage based on late notice); Matador, 174
F.3d at 658-59 (same); EmCode Reimbursement Solutions, Inc. v. Nutmeg Ins. Co., 512 F.
Supp. 2d 603, 609 (N.D. Tex. 2007) ("Under Texas law, an insurer is not required to show
prejudice by late notice under a claims-made policy."); Precis, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13985, at *18-19 (N.D. Tex. July 12, 2005), aff'd 184 F. App'x 439 (5th
Cir. 2006); Fed. Ins. Co. v. CompUSA, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 612, 617 (N.D. Tex. 2002), affd
319 F.3d 746 (5th Cir. 2003) (same); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Willis,
139 F. Supp. 2d 827, 832 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (same); Int'l Ins. Co. v. RSR Corp., 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16569, at *26 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 11, 2001) (same); Hirsch, 808 S.W.2d at 565 ("To
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CompUSA, Inc., the Northern District of Texas noted that the effect of an
insured's noncompliance with a notice provision "depends on whether ...
a 'claims-made' [policy] or occurrence 'policy' is at issue." 16 According to
the court, under a claims-made policy, notice itself constitutes the event
that triggers coverage. Because the policy provided that, "as a condition
precedent" to coverage, the insured was to provide notice to the insurer
''as soon as practicable," the court found that the insured's eleven-month
delay in providing notice constituted a breach of the notice provision and
failure of the condition precedent to coverage.17 Therefore, the insurer
was not required to show prejudice to deny coverage. The Fifth Circuit
adopted the district court's opinion in its entirety.' 8
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit was again faced with the issue of "whether an
insurer must show prejudice to deny [coverage under] a claims-made pol-
icy."19 The Fifth Circuit initially noted that the supreme court's reasoning
from Hernandez was "arguably broad enough" to require that a breach of
an insurance contract must be material, i.e., "must cause prejudice[,] to
excuse performance by the non-breaching party."20 The Fifth Circuit also
noted that under the facts, it was reluctant to apply its prior holdings as a
uniform rule due to the cases pending at the time before the supreme
court addressing the late-notice issue.21 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit certi-
fied the following question to the Texas Supreme Court: "Must an insurer
show prejudice to deny payment on a claims-made policy, when the de-
nial is based upon the insured's breach of the policy's prompt-notice pro-
vision, but the notice is nevertheless given within the policy's coverage
period?"22
One of those pending cases was Prodigy Communications Corp. v. Ag-
ricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance Co. 2 3 In that case, the supreme
court extended the rationale from PAJ to a claims-made policy and held
that an insured's breach of a notice condition must result in a material
breach of the policy for the insurer to deny coverage. 24 The supreme
court limited the ruling to the facts of the case, however, specifically rec-
require a showing of prejudice for late notice would defeat the purpose of 'claims-made'
policies, and in effect, change such policy into an 'occurrence' policy."); Komatsu v. U.S.
Fire Ins. Co., 806 S.W.2d 603, 607 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied); Yancey v.
Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied).
16. 239 F. Supp. 2d at 617.
17. Id. at 616, 618.
18. Fed. Ins. Co. v. CompUSA, Inc., 319 F.3d 746, 750 (5th Cir. 2003).
19. XL Specialty Ins. Co. v. Fin. Indus. Corp., 259 F. App'x 675 (5th Cir. 2007).
20. Id. at 676-77.
21. Id. at 677-78. The following late notice cases were pending before the Texas Su-
preme Court at that time: Coastal Ref. & Mktg., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. and Guar. Co., 218
S.W.3d 279 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Lennar Corp. v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 200 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, pet. denied); Prodigy
Commc'ns Corp. v. Agric. Excess & Surplus Ins. Co., 195 S.W.3d 764 (Tex. App.-Dallas
2006), rev'd 288 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2009); PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 170 S.W.3d 258
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2005), rev'd 243 S.W.3d 630 (Tex. 2008).
22. XL, 259 F. App'x at 678; see infra text accompanying notes 38-42.
23. 288 S.W.3d 374 (Tex. 2009).
24. See id. at 382.
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ognizing that although notice was late, the insured had provided it within
the extended reporting deadline. Prodigy involved a directors and of-
ficers liability policy issued by Agricultural Excess & Surplus Insurance
Company (AESIC) to FlashNet Communications (FlashNet) that pro-
vided coverage for "claims first made during the [March 16, 2000 to May
31, 2003] policy period." 25 The policy's notice provision required that the
insured, "as a condition precedent," give notice of any claim "as soon as
practicable ... but in no event later than ninety (90) days after the expira-
tion of the Policy Period, or Discovery Period."26 A lawsuit naming
FlashNet as a defendant was filed and served upon Prodigy Communica-
tions (Prodigy) on June 20, 2002, but Prodigy did not provide notice of
the lawsuit to AESIC within the ninety-day period after the end of the
policy period. 27 AESIC denied coverage based on the insured's breach of
the policy's notice condition. Prodigy responded that notice was timely
because it was within ninety days of the expiration of the policy's discov-
ery period.28
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court was:
[W]hether, under a claims-made policy, an insurer can deny coverage
based on its insured's alleged failure to comply with a policy provi-
sion requiring that notice of a claim be given "as soon as practica-
ble," when (1) notice of the claim was provided before the reporting
deadline specified in the policy; and (2) the insurer was not
prejudiced by the delay. 29
Although the notice provision in the policy specifically required Prodigy
to provide notice to AESIC as a condition precedent to coverage, the
supreme court noted that its decision in PAJ was not based on the differ-
ences between conditions and covenants, but instead on "fundamental
principle[s] of contract law" that only a material breach of contract will
excuse a party's performance.30 The supreme court then turned its focus
to the key distinctions and similarities between occurrence and claims-
made policies and the notice requirements associated with each. Accord-
ing to the supreme court, claims-made policies "provide[] unlimited ret-
roactive coverage and no prospective coverage, while an 'occurrence'
policy provides unlimited prospective coverage and no retroactive cover-
age." 31 Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged that re-
quiring an insured to report a claim during the policy period or within a
specified time period is essential to coverage under a claims-made-and-
reported policy. 32 Under those circumstances, an insurer need not
25. Id. at 387. In May 2000, Prodigy Communications merged with FlashNet. It ap-
pears that the surviving entity was Prodigy Communications. See id. at 375-76.
26. Id. at 376.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 377.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 378.




demonstrate prejudice when the insured fails to give notice of a claim
within such a policy's policy period or other specified time period.33
However, the supreme court then determined that an insured's failure
to provide notice "as soon as practicable" under a claims-made policy is
not a material breach of the policy when notice is given during the policy
period or other reporting period, as receiving notice "as soon as practica-
ble" is not an essential part of the bargained-for exchange under the pol-
icy. 34 Specifically, the supreme court found that Prodigy's failure to
provide notice "as soon as practicable" was not a material breach of the
policy because "AESIC was not denied the benefit of the claims-made
nature of its policy as it could not 'close its books' on the policy until
ninety days after the discovery period expired."35 Accordingly, the Texas
Supreme Court held that AESIC could not deny coverage unless it was
prejudiced by Prodigy's noncompliance with the notice provision.36 As
AESIC had admitted it was not prejudiced, the supreme court reversed
the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial
court.37
On the same day the supreme court issued Prodigy, it also answered
the Fifth Circuit's certified question in Financial Industries Corp. v. XL
Specialty Insurance Co.3 8 In that case, XL Specialty Insurance Company
(XL) issued a claims-made policy to Financial Industries Corporation
(FIC) with a policy period of March 12, 2005 to March 12, 2006. The
policy provided that as a condition precedent, FIC "shall give written no-
tice to [XL] of any Claim as soon as practicable after it is first made."39
FIC was sued in a Texas state court on June 5, 2005, but it did not notify
XL until seven months later. FIC did provide notice, however, to XL
during the policy period.40
In answering the certified question, the supreme court noted Prodigy
and reiterated that an insured's failure to give notice "as soon as practica-
ble" is not a material breach of the policy when notice is received during
the policy period. Specifically, because FIC provided notice of the suit
within the policy period and before XL could "close its books" on the
policy, XL was not denied any benefits provided by the nature of the
claims-made policy. 4 1 Thus, the supreme court held that "an insurer must
show prejudice to deny payment on a claims-made policy, when the de-
nial is based upon the insured's breach of the policy's prompt-notice pro-
33. Id. at 380-81.
34. Id. at 382-83.
35. Id. at 382.
36. Id. at 382-83.
37. Id.
38. 285 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex. 2009). See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
39. Id. at 878. Whereas Prodigy involved a claims-made-and-reported policy, at issue
in XL was a claims-made policy requiring the insured provide notice "as soon as practica-
ble." Compare Prodigy, 288 S.W.3d 374, 376, 380 n.7 (Tex. 2009), with XL, 285 S.W.3d at
878.
40. XL, 285 S.W.3d at 878.
41. Id. at 878-79.
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vision, but the notice is given within the policy's coverage period." 42
After PAJ, Prodigy, and XL, it is settled that an insurer must show
prejudice to deny coverage for late notice under an occurrence-based lia-
bility policy. It is also clear that an insurer must show prejudice to deny
coverage for an insured's breach of a notice condition under a claims-
made policy if notice is provided late, but before the expiration of the
policy period or other specified reporting deadline. Insurers can argua-
bly infer from Prodigy and XL that no prejudice requirement exists
under a claims-made policy when an insured provides notice after the pol-
icy period or other specified reporting deadline. This is consistent with
the holdings from CompUSA and other cases that have addressed this
issue, which are still good law as of the date of this Article.43 Policyhold-
ers, however, could argue that because the supreme court has not directly
addressed the issue, Prodigy and XL represent a trend toward the impo-
sition of a uniform late-notice rule under Texas law, regardless of whether
the insured provides notice during or after the policy period or other re-
porting deadline. Policyholders might point to the Fifth Circuit's recent
decision in East Texas Medical Center Regional Healthcare System v. Lex-
ington Insurance Co. to support their position.44
In that case, the late-notice issue came before the Fifth Circuit again,
this time in the context of a claims-made excess medical malpractice in-
surance policy. 4 5 Lexington Insurance Company (Lexington) issued a
one-year claims-made policy to East Texas Medical Center Regional
Healthcare System (the Medical Center) that provided excess liability
coverage for claims above the $2 million self-insured retention. Per the
terms of the policy, the Medical Center was required to provide Lexing-
ton written notice of any claims or lawsuits that it believed would exceed
that self-insured retention and "immediately" forward copies of all claim-
or suit-related demands. 46
The Medical Center received a claim letter in March 2003 stating that a
patient had sustained unspecified personal injuries at one of the Medical
Center's facilities. The information from that claim letter was entered
into a computer-generated spreadsheet known as a "loss run" and for-
warded to Lexington. On May 27, 2003, the patient's mother sued the
Medical Center in state court. Because it was responsible for processing,
monitoring, and defending claims it believed were below the self-insured
retention, the Medical Center initially appointed defense counsel to file
an answer and defend the suit. 4 7 The policy expired on June 8, 2003,
approximately two weeks after the lawsuit was filed. At the end of the
policy period, the notation of the claim letter on the loss run represented
the only notice of the claim that the Medical Center had provided to Lex-
42. Id. at 879 (emphasis added).
43. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
44. See 575 F.3d 520, 532 (5th Cir. 2009).
45. Id. at 523.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 523-24.
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ington.48 In January 2004-seven months after the policy expired-the
Medical Center first gave written notice of the lawsuit to Lexington. Af-
ter Lexington denied coverage based on late notice, the Medical Center
brought a coverage action against Lexington in federal court.
One issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether Lexington was required
to show prejudice by the Medical Center's failure to provide prompt no-
tice of the lawsuit.49 Initially, the Fifth Circuit noted that the policy re-
quired the Medical Center to provide Lexington with notice of the claim
and notice of the lawsuit, and that notice of one would not suffice for the
other.50 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the initial claim letter was
reported to Lexington via the "loss runs" within the policy period. How-
ever, notice of the lawsuit was not reported to Lexington until seven
months after the policy expired. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit held that
because the notice of the initial claim was provided within the policy pe-
riod, Lexington would be unable to "close its books" until it knew
whether a suit would actually be filed.51 Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that
"[a]s long as notice of the underlying claim had been timely given, cover-
age would exist under either a claims-made or claims-made and reported
policy."5 2
Although policyholders might argue that Lexington represents an ero-
sion of the rule from Comp USA that an insurer may deny coverage for
notice received after the policy period or other reporting deadline, the
facts from Lexington show that it can be easily reconciled with Prodigy,
XL, and Comp USA. Specifically, the Medical Center did provide notice
of the claim during the policy period, like in Prodigy and XL. Thus, not-
withstanding the fact that the insured did not provide notice of the law-
suit until after the policy period, the insurer could not "close its books"
on the policy and was not denied the "inherent benefit" of the claims-
made policy. Additionally, the Fifth Circuit did not overrule Comp USA,
thus implying that its decision was meant to be read in light of that opin-
ion.53 Therefore, while insurers and policyholders will likely debate the
significance of Lexington in disputes over late notice, it appears that the
decision does not provide new guidance on the issue. Accordingly, we
expect litigation over the applicability of the notice-prejudice rule to con-
tinue in the future.
III. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
In its 2007 opinion in Mid-Continent Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., the Texas Supreme Court restricted the rights of co-insur-
ers to seek reimbursement or contribution from each other pursuant to
48. Id. at 524.
49. Id. at 527-28.
50. Id. at 527 (citing Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278, 279-80 (Tex.
1972)).
51. Id. at 530.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 532.
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their pro rata clauses after payments made on behalf of mutual in-
sureds.54 The supreme court specifically noted that any "direct claim for
contribution between co-insurers disappears when the insurance policies
contain 'other insurance' or 'pro rata' clauses."55 Thus, if one co-insurer
pays more than it is legally obligated to pay, without a contractual right of
contribution, there is no right to contribution. 56 Additionally, because
the right of subrogation is based upon the insurer "stepping into the
shoes" of its insured, if the insured is fully indemnified, it will have no
right to pass its rights to the insurer for it to enforce.57
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit again had the opportunity
to address whether an insurer has a subrogation right against a co-insurer
that refused to participate or contribute to a settlement involving its in-
sured.58 In Nautilus, EOG Resources, Incorporated (EOG) had primary
coverage as an additional insured under policies issued by Nautilus Insur-
ance Company (Nautilus) and Pacific Employers Insurance Company
(Pacific). Just as in Mid-Continent, the Nautilus and Pacific policies con-
tained identical pro rata clauses, which stated that if other primary cover-
age were available, each insurer would pay a pro rata share of any
settlement or judgment against the insured.59 Several homeowners sued
EOG, alleging that its seismic surveying and blasting activities caused
their homes to suffer foundation defects. EOG sought coverage for the
lawsuits from Pacific and Nautilus. 6 0
As the litigation progressed, Nautilus and the other insurance compa-
nies involved settled some of the lawsuits for $3.5 million, which included
a voluntary $1.5 million payment by Nautilus within its $2 million limit.
However, Pacific refused to contribute to the settlement and the remain-
ing lawsuits went to trial. In the end, none of the homeowners' suits were
successful. "Thus, Pacific did not contribute to the settlement and did not
pay anything in the underlying state court cases." 61 Asserting that it was
"contractually and equitably subrogated to the rights of EOG" under its
policy, Nautilus sued Pacific seeking to recover the amount it claimed
that Pacific should have paid on behalf of EOG.6 2 After the Texas Su-
preme Court's opinion in Mid-Continent, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment for Pacific. Nautilus appealed. 63
The issue on appeal involved whether the district court had appropri-
54. 236 S.W.3d 765, 768, 777 (Tex. 2007). For a detailed discussion, please see the 2007
Insurance Law Survey. J. Price Collins, Ashley E. Frizzell & Omar Galicia, Insurance Law,
61 SMU L. REv. 877, 879-81 (2008).
55. Id. at 772.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 777.
58. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Pac. Employers Ins. Co, 303 F. App'x 201, 203 (5th Cir. 2008).
59. Id. at 202.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 202-203.




ately applied the holding from Mid-Continent.64 Nautilus made several
arguments attempting to distinguish Mid-Continent. First, it argued that
the Texas Supreme Court had intended Mid-Continent to be "narrow"
and apply "only when an insurer settles a case to 'protect its own cof-
fers." 65 Specifically, Nautilus argued that because Liberty Mutual pro-
vided the insured in Mid-Continent with an excess policy, it had a "self-
serving motive to settle" the case to avoid liability under that policy. 66
Therefore, according to Nautilus, the supreme court's ruling was simply
"that an insurer cannot recover from a co-insurer based . . . [on] . . .
subrogation when the insurer pays a claim to protect its own financial
interests." 67 In rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that Nau-
tilus itself may have been concerned with additional liability, as it had
settled the homeowners' claims for $500,000 less than its limit.6 8 Addi-
tionally, according to the Fifth Circuit, the supreme court mentioned ex-
cess insurance in Mid-Continent only to distinguish that opinion from a
prior opinion in which it had recognized an excess insurer's equitable sub-
rogation rights.69 Thus, simply because Liberty Mutual acted as a pri-
mary and excess insurer in Mid-Continent had no effect on the case at
bar.
Second, Nautilus argued that if the court ruled that it had no subroga-
tion rights, several policy concerns would be implicated. In particular,
Nautilus "assert[ed] that an insurer will be less likely to settle a suit if it
cannot recover the money it pays to settle a case[,]" and "a broad reading
of Mid-Continent will lead to the elimination of the right of subroga-
tion."70 Nautilus also suggested that the elimination of subrogation
would cause "unfair distribution of losses among insurers."71 The Fifth
Circuit found these arguments unavailing and noted that whether the su-
preme court's "decision in Mid-Continent will have these policy effects
... is within the province of the Texas Supreme Court to decide." 72 To
the contrary, the Fifth Circuit noted, as Pacific "bore the risk" by refusing
to settle the claims and then prevailing at trial, it would be inequitable to
make it contribute under the circumstances.73 Accordingly, the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that because EOG had been fully indemnified by its insurers
and therefore had no rights to enforce against Pacific, Nautilus therefore
had no right of subrogation against Pacific.74
64. Id.
65. Id. at 205.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 206.






74. Id. at 207.
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In 2008, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas in Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Employers Mutual Casualty
Co. extended Mid-Continent to the duty to defend, holding that an in-
surer could not seek reimbursement of defense costs, through contribu-
tion or subrogation, from a co-insurer that wrongfully refused to
contribute to the defense of their common insured.7 5 The Fifth Circuit,
however, reversed this holding subsequent to the Survey period, finding
that the district court had "mischaracterized" the supreme court's holding
from Mid-Continent.76 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that the Texas
Supreme Court in Mid-Continent addressed only the question of whether
a co-insurer could seek reimbursement under its "other insurance" clause
through contribution or subrogation from a non-paying co-insurer for
amounts paid to indemnify their common insured.77
According to the Fifth Circuit, "Mid-Continent left open the separate
question of whether a co-insurer that pays more than its share of defense
costs may recover such costs from a co-insurer who violates its duty to
defend a common insured."7 The Fifth Circuit focused on the fact that
the "other insurance" clauses address only "an insured's loss" but do not
implicate a similar proration of defense costs incurred during the de-
fense.79 Importantly, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the long-standing princi-
ple that, although an insurer may owe only a portion of the costs
associated with the defense of the insured, it has a complete duty to de-
fend the insured that is "'equally and concurrently due' by all . . . insur-
ers."80 The Fifth Circuit therefore held that the insurer seeking
contribution established that it had paid a compulsory payment of more
than its proportionate share of defense costs and was therefore entitled to
contribution from the non-participating insurer.81
In reaching its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit recognized existing Texas
law that when two insurers owe concurrent defense obligations to a mu-
tual insured, one carrier's agreement to provide a defense does not allevi-
ate the other from its contractual duties.8 2 If this principle were ignored
and the holding from Mid-Continent were applied to the duty to defend,
this would effectively penalize a carrier that recognizes and assumes its
75. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 586 F. Supp. 2d 718, 728-30
(S.D. Tex. 2008). For a detailed discussion, please refer to the 2008 Insurance Law Survey.
J. Price Collins, Ashley E. Frizzell & Blake H. Crawford, Insurance Law, 62 SMU L. REV.
1267, 1289 (2009).
76. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 592 F.3d 687, 694, 696 (5th
Cir. 2010).
77. id. at 694-95.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 695 (citing Mid-Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765,
772 (Tex. 2007)); see also Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Group, 535 F.3d 359,
363 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that insurers must provide a complete defense under Texas
law); Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Sw. Aggregates, Inc., 982 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (noting that if one claim potentially falls within coverage, the
insurer must defend the entire suit).
81. Trinity Universal, 592 F.3d at 695-96.
82. See Tex. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 982 S.W.2d at 606.
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duty to defend, while rewarding a carrier that delays in assuming its obli-
gations. This would likely create situations where carriers would be hesi-
tant to step up and assume their contractual duties, which would in turn
severely impair the rights of insureds. It appears that the insurer in Nau-
tilus made this type of policy argument, but the Fifth Circuit took the
position that the supreme court had already conclusively decided the is-
sue. Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit, only a year later in Trinity Universal,
found that the holding from Mid-Continent was in fact limited to the duty
to indemnify-even though the supreme court never made that statement
in its opinion. Future litigation of issues related to contribution and sub-
rogation will likely revolve around determining the scope of the holding
from Mid-Continent, as this will affect both insureds and insurers in the
context of defense and settlement negotiations.
IV. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE DUTY To DEFEND
Extrinsic Evidence and the "Eight-Corners" Rule
The issue of whether extrinsic evidence may be used to determine
whether the duty to defend exists has been a heavily debated topic in
Texas over the past several years. The Texas Supreme Court again had
the opportunity to address this ongoing issue in Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v.
Great American Lloyds Insurance Co.8 3 In that case, five separate home-
owners sued Pine Oak Builders, Incorporated (Pine Oak) alleging that
their homes suffered from water damage resulting from Pine Oak's defec-
tive construction. In four of the underlying suits, there were specific alle-
gations that subcontractors performed the defective work. However, in
one of the underlying lawsuits (the Glass suit), the plaintiffs attributed all
the defective work to Pine Oak and made no allegations that subcontrac-
tors performed any work on the home.
Pine Oak submitted the lawsuits for coverage to its insurers, Great
American Lloyds Insurance Company (Great American) and Mid-Conti-
nent Casualty Company (Mid-Continent). The insurers denied coverage
for all the lawsuits. Particularly, Great American denied coverage for the
Glass suit based on "Exclusion '1'" (the "your work" exclusion), which
excludes coverage for property damage to the insured's completed work
unless "the damaged work or the work out of which the damage [arose]
was performed on [Pine Oak's] behalf by a subcontractor."84 After that,
Pine Oak sued both insurers alleging that they had breached their de-
fense obligations. The insurers sought declaratory relief that they owed
no defense or indemnity to Pine Oak.85 Pine Oak sought to introduce
extrinsic evidence that subcontractors had performed the allegedly defec-
tive work in the Glass suit. The trial court granted the insurers' motions
83. 279 S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2009).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 652.
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for summary judgment in their entirety. The court of appeals affirmed
the summary judgment relating to the Glass suit based on the "your
work" exclusion, but concluded that Great American had a duty to de-
fend Pine Oak in the four other underlying suits. 8 6 Both parties
appealed.
One of the issues before the supreme court was "whether evidence ex-
trinsic to the eight corners of the policy and the underlying lawsuit may
be used to establish the insurer's duty to defend."87 Specifically, the su-
preme court focused on whether Pine Oak could introduce extrinsic evi-
dence in the coverage action illustrating that subcontractors actually
performed the allegedly defective work that was the subject of the Glass
suit.88 If Pine Oak could introduce this evidence, the exception to the
"your work" exclusion would apply, and Great American would have a
duty to defend Pine Oak in the Glass suit.
To resolve the issue, the supreme court began by reciting one of the
most basic principles in Texas insurance law: The duty to defend is deter-
mined by the "eight corners" of the underlying pleading and the terms of
the policy. 8 9 The supreme court further acknowledged that although it
has never officially recognized an exception to the eight-corners rule, any
exception "would not extend to evidence that was relevant to both insur-
ance coverage and the factual merits of the case as alleged by the third-
party plaintiff."90 Here, the extrinsic evidence that Pine Oak sought to
introduce to establish the duty to defend clearly contradicted the allega-
tions in the underlying petition of the Glass suit. As such, it would over-
lap with both the coverage and liability aspects of the underlying lawsuit
and would not fit within the guidelines established in GuideOne.
Specifically, the allegations in the Glass suit were that Pine Oak alone
constructed the columns, "failed to . . . seal seams," "failed 'to perform
work in a good and workmanlike manner,"' and failed to make repairs.91
These claims, according to the supreme court, would be excluded in their
entirety pursuant to the "your work" exclusion. Additionally, there was
neither any reference to work performed by a subcontractor nor any alle-
gation that Pine Oak was responsible "under any theory for the conduct
or work of a subcontractor." 9 2  The supreme court held that extrinsic
evidence that contradicts the allegations of the underlying petition,
whether from an insurer or an insured, should not be considered in deter-
mining the duty to defend. 93 Because the evidence Pine Oak sought to
86. Id. With respect to Mid-Continent, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment in its entirety based on an EIFS exclusion. Id.
87. Id. at 653.
88. Id. at 651-54.
89. Id. at 654 (citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Merchs. Fast Motor
Lines, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 139, 141 (Tex. 1997)).
90. Id. (citing GuideOne Elite Ins. Co. v. Fielder Rd. Baptist Church, 197 S.W.3d 305,
309 (Tex. 2006)).
91. Id.




introduce would have contradicted the allegations in the petition, it was
therefore inadmissible. 94
Likewise, in Accufleet, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., the Houston
First Court of Appeals rejected an argument that it should look to extrin-
sic evidence in the form of deposition testimony, correspondence from
the insured's attorney, and the insured's responsive pleadings to deter-
mine whether the insurer had a duty to defend.95 The court of appeals
declined to recognize an exception to the eight-corners rule, noting that
the Texas Supreme Court has never expressly recognized any such
exception. 96
Additionally, just after the Survey period, in D.R. Horton-Texas, Ltd.
v. Markel International Insurance Co., Ltd., the Texas Supreme Court had
the opportunity to decide whether it would recognize a "coverage only"
exception to the eight-corners rule.97 In that case, homeowners sued
their general contractor for various alleged construction defects related to
the construction of their home. The general contractor sought coverage
from one of its subcontractor's insurers, who refused to defend because
its insured-subcontractor was not named in the homeowners' petition.98
The general contractor sued the subcontractor's insurer and sought to in-
troduce evidence that the subcontractor had performed the allegedly de-
fective work. The court of appeals refused to allow the general
contractor to introduce the extrinsic evidence, citing that the evidence
related to both coverage and liability issues.99 On appeal, the supreme
court refused to decide whether there is a coverage-only exception to the
eight-corners rule, stating that the general contractor waived the issue by
not raising the argument until its second motion for rehearing at the court
of appeals. 00 The supreme court also held that even if an insurer has no
duty to defend, it may still have a duty to indemnify its insured based on
the actual facts. 101 This represents a shift from the belief that if an in-
surer had no duty to defend, it also had no duty to indemnify. Thus, if an
insurer has no duty to defend based on the allegations, it must still ex-
amine extrinsic evidence to determine if it may have a duty to indemnify
its insured.
Though the supreme court again did not recognize an "official" excep-
tion to the eight-corners rule, it again gave the indication that any such
exception would be for coverage-only evidence. Clearly, if the supreme
court had allowed Pine Oak to introduce evidence that subcontractors
94. See id. at 656.
95. No. 01-08-00684-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 7313, at *16-17 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2009, no pet.).
96. Id. at *17.
97. 300 S.W.3d 740, 742-43 (Tex. 2009).
98. Id. at 741-42.
99. D.R. Horton-Tex., Ltd. v. Markel Int'l Ins. Co., 300 S.W.3d 773, 781 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 300 S.W.3d 740, 745 (Tex. 2009).
100. D.R. Horton, 300 S.W.3d at 742-43.
101. See id. at 744-45. As this case was outside the Survey period, please look for a
detailed discussion regarding its affect in the 2011 Insurance Law Article.
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performed work in the Glass suit, this would have set a precedent requir-
ing insurers to perform possibly unnecessary investigation regarding is-
sues not addressed in the pleadings. This would likely undermine the
purpose of the eight-corners rule under Texas law.
B. BINDING EFFECT OF DEFAULT JUDGMENT AGAINST INSURED
AFTER INSURER BREACHES DUTY To DEFEND
In 2008, the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Evanston Insur-
ance Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc. and held that a liability in-
surer that wrongfully denies coverage to its insured cannot later challenge
the reasonableness of the amount of the insured's settlement with a third-
party claimant.102 In the process, the supreme court provided clarifica-
tion regarding the scope of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy03
and Employers Casualty Co. v. Block,104 which involved issues of whether
an insurer is bound by an insured's settlement.105
Based on the guidance from the supreme court in ATOFINA, the Fifth
Circuit addressed in Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. JHP Development,
Inc. whether a liability insurer that breaches its duty to defend is bound
by a default judgment against its insured.106 In Mid-Continent, the in-
surer refused to defend its insured in a lawsuit arising out of the insured's
allegedly defective construction of a condominium project. The insurer's
position was that there was no "occurrence" or "property damage," and,
to the extent those requirements were satisfied, various exclusions pre-
cluded coverage under the policy.107 The third-party claimant subse-
quently obtained a default judgment against the insured for
approximately $1.5 million.108
The insurer sought declaratory relief, arguing, among other things, that,
pursuant to Gandy, it was not bound by the default judgment, because
the default judgment was not the result of a fully adversarial proceed-
ing.' 09 The Fifth Circuit stated that the Texas Supreme Court had re-
cently explained that the Gandy holding was "narrow, applying only to a
specific set of assignments with special attributes," and that Gandy only
applies in cases involving the five unique elements outlined in that
case.1 0 Noting that the case before it did not involve a suit against the
insurer by a plaintiff acting as the insured's assignee or any other unique
element, the Fifth Circuit held that Gandy did not apply."' Instead, the
Fifth Circuit, relying on Block, held that because the insurer breached its
102. 256 S.W.3d 660, 674-75 (Tex. 2008).
103. 925 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. 1996).
104. 744 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1988).
105. ATOFINA, 256 S.W.3d at 671-75.
106. 557 F.3d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 2009).
107. Id. at 210.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 217 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 714 (Tex.
1996)).




duty to defend, it was bound by the amount of the default judgment
against its insured in the underlying suit.11 2
V. EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE PROMPT PAYMENT OF CLAIMS STATUTE
The Prompt Payment of Claims Statute (the Statute) in the Texas In-
surance Code authorizes that an insured may receive an award of eigh-
teen percent annual interest and reasonable attorneys' fees if its insurer
wrongfully refuses or delays payment of a "claim."" 3 The Statute defines
the term "claim" as a first-party claim by an insured that the insurer must
pay directly to the insured or beneficiary.114 Another provision within
the Statute provides that "if an insurer, after receiving all items, state-
ments, and forms reasonably requested and required .. . delays payment
of the claim for a period exceeding . . . more than 60 days, the insurer
shall pay damages and other items as provided by Section 542.060."s In
Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., the Texas Supreme
Court settled a heavily debated issue regarding the applicability of the
statute in third-party liability claims, holding that an insured's right to a
defense constitutes a first-party claim, and therefore the Statute applies if
the insurer wrongfully refuses to provide the defense owed.116 However,
in Evanston Insurance Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc., the Texas
Supreme Court held that the Statute does not extend to an insured's
claim under a liability policy for indemnification of a third-party claim." 7
In Trammell Crow Residential Co. v. Virginia Surety Co., the Northern
District of Texas addressed issues relating to when the damages author-
ized by the Statute become payable and how those damages are calcu-
lated."s In that case, Trammell Crow Residential Company (Trammell
Crow) sought coverage from its insurer, Virginia Surety Company, Incor-
porated (Virginia Surety), for a lawsuit in which it was alleged that Tram-
mell Crow discriminated against people with disabilities in violation of
federal law. After Virginia Surety denied coverage, Trammel Crow sued,
alleging that Virginia Surety violated the Statute by failing to provide a
defense.119
Trammell Crow contended that from the day on which Virginia Surety
denied coverage, it had incurred significant defense costs relating to the
underlying lawsuit. Trammell Crow further contended that Virginia
Surety wrongfully refused to pay these defense costs, and that because it
112. Id.
113. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060(a) (Vernon 2009).
114. Id. § 542.051(2).
115. Id. § 542.058(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009).
116. 242 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex. 2007). See also Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds
Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009) (reiterating that the Statute applies to an insurer's
breach of its duty to defend under a liability policy).
117. 256 S.W.3d 660, 674-75 (Tex. 2008).
118. 643 F. Supp. 2d 844, 856-60 (N.D. Tex 2008).
119. Id. at 848-49.
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delayed more than sixty days in paying the defense costs, Virginia Surety
had violated the Statue.120 Virginia Surety responded that it could not be
liable under the Statute because Trammell Crow had not submitted any
legal bills or invoices for the expenses incurred in defending the underly-
ing lawsuit. Virginia Surety argued that "[t]he legal fee statements or
invoices are necessary last pieces of information needed to put a value on
the insured's loss."121 In essence, Virginia Surety argued that its liability
under the Statute would not be triggered until Trammell Crow submitted
the invoices demonstrating its actual loss.
The district court rejected Virginia Surety's argument, noting that
neither the supreme court's Lamar Homes opinion nor § 542.060 refers to
"submitted" defense costs. 12 2 Instead, the court concluded "that Lamar
Homes is best understood as holding that an insurer becomes liable under
the [S]tatute when it wrongfully rejects its defense obligation, but that
attorney's fees cannot be awarded, and prejudgment interest does not be-
gin accruing, until the insured actually incurs the defense costs."12 3 Thus,
the court continued, "there can be a determination of liability without a
calculation of damages."1 24 The court, therefore, granted Trammell
Crow's motion for summary judgment on its claim that Virginia Surety
had violated the Statute and found that the exact amount of damages,
fees, and prejudgment interest would be determined at trial.125
After Lamar Homes, many believed that the supreme court had estab-
lished that an insurer's responsibility to pay the defense costs did not be-
gin until the insured actually submitted bills for payment. This
assumption was based on the following statement from that case regard-
ing the triggering event for the penalty under the Statute: "[W]hen the
insurer wrongfully rejects its defense obligation, the insured has suffered
an actual loss that is quantified after the insured retains counsel and begins
receiving statements for legal services. These statements or invoices are
the last piece of information needed to put a value on the insured's
loss."126 Nevertheless, the federal district court in Trammel Crow sug-
gests that an insurer's liability under the Statute is not dependent upon
when it receives the bills, but instead triggers as soon as it wrongfully
120. Id. at 858.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 858-59.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 859-60.
126. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 242 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. 2007) (em-
phasis added) (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.056(a) (Vernon 2007)). See also Primrose
Operating Co. v. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 546, 565 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding prejudg-
ment interest accrues from the date the insured paid the bills rather than the day when the
insurer denied coverage); TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 241
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (querying whether an insured would have "to con-
tinually submit his legal bills" to be entitled to extra-contractual penalties under the
Statute).
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rejects its insured's request for a defense. 127 Whether this suggestion is
what the supreme court intended in Lamar Homes is yet to be
determined.
B. THE UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE Acrs OR PRACTICES STATUTE AND
COMMON-LAW BAD FAITH
In Spicewood Summit Office Condominiums Ass'n v. America First
Lloyd's Insurance Co., the insured claimed that the insurer breached the
common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing and violated Chapter 541
of the Texas Insurance Code (Chapter 541) by wrongfully withholding
insurance benefits. 128 In that case, the insured sought coverage for wind
and hail damage to five two-story commercial buildings. After the insurer
performed an initial evaluation of the property and provided an estimate
of the damages and repair costs, the insured retained its own roof consult-
ant. The insured's roof consultant estimated the damages and repair
costs to be much higher than the insurer's estimate. The insurer subse-
quently had the property reinspected by independent adjusters three ad-
ditional times. The insurer also had an engineering company investigate
the property and prepare a detailed report regarding the damage.129
During each reinspection and during the engineer's investigation, the
roof and siding of the property were found to need no additional repair
or replacement. Nevertheless, after each reinspection, the insurer made
supplemental payments to the insured.' 30 The insured subsequently sued
the insurer, claiming that the payments made by the insurer for the loss
under the policy were insufficient and that the insurer had violated Chap-
ter 541.131 The trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judg-
ment, ruling that the insured's "extra-contractual claims were precluded
because 'there was, at most, a bona fide dispute regarding the extent of
damage and valuation of [the insured's] loss."1 32 The insured appealed.
The insured's argument on appeal, according to the Austin Court of
Appeals, appeared to be that the evidence that the insurer engaged in
bad faith came from the fact that it agreed to perform additional assess-
ments of damage at the insured's property, which, after each inspection,
resulted in the insurer issuing supplement payments to the insured. 33
The court of appeals disagreed, noting that in agreeing to the additional
assessments of damage, the insurer demonstrated good faith in attempt-
ing to settle the claim.134 The court of appeals further noted that "[t]o
127. Tramell Crow Residential Co. v. Va. Sur. Co., 643 F. Supp. 2d 844, 858-60 (N.D.
Tex. 2008).
128. 287 S.W.3d 461, 463, 468 (Tex. App.-Austin 2009, pet. denied). Chapter 541 of
the Texas Insurance Code is commonly referred to as the "Unfair or Deceptive Acts or
Practices Statute."
129. Id. at 469.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 464.
132. Id.




find otherwise might encourage insurers to stand by their initial assess-
ments for fear that their willingness to consider new evidence and issue
supplemental payments would indicate their initial assessments were
made in bad faith."135
The court of appeals held that the insured failed to produce any evi-
dence demonstrating that there was more than a bona fide dispute re-
garding the amount of the loss.13 6 To support its conclusion, the court
noted that the insured was not arguing that the insurer should have paid
the full amount at the time of the initial assessment, but instead, that the
insured argued that the amount paid by the insurer was insufficient.137
Additionally, the insured's requesting several assessments of the damage
to the property, was not evidence that the insurer's final assessment of
damage was unreasonable.13 8 Finally, the court of appeals determined
that the insurer's making payments over time was not evidence that the
amount paid to the insured was insufficient.13 9 The court of appeals
therefore affirmed the trial court's judgment regarding the insured's com-
mon-law bad faith and Chapter 541 claims.140
VI. COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICIES
A. THE "PROPERTY DAMAGE" TRIGGER OF COVERAGE
Until the Texas Supreme Court issued its opinion in Don's Building
Supply, Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance Co.,141 Texas courts were split re-
garding the coverage trigger applicable in the context of a CGL policy. 14 2
In Don's Building, the supreme court adopted the "actual injury" (or "in-
jury in fact") rule, which states that "property damage" occurs when ac-
tual physical damage to the property occurs.143 Because most of the
courts have applied the "manifestation" theory and some courts had ap-
plied the "exposure" theory in the past,144 this newly adopted rule may
lead to circumstances where courts struggle to interpret and apply the
holding from Don's Building. In fact, the supreme court itself recognized






140. Id. at 470-71.
141. 267 S.W.3d 20 (Tex. 2008).
142. Compare Guar. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Azrock Indus., 211 F.3d 239, 245-48 (5th Cir.
2000); Summit Custom Homes, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 202 S.W.3d 823, 827
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, pet. withdrawn); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88
S.W.3d 313, 322 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Kelly, 945 S.W.2d 905, 910 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, writ denied) (following the
"manifestation" theory), with Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 292
S.W.3d 48, 58-59 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2006), rev'd 279 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009)
(applying the "exposure" theory); Pilgrim Enters., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 24 S.W.3d 488, 497-
98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
143. Don's Bldg., 267 S.W.3d at 22-24.
144. See supra note 142.
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tively is sometimes difficult, but we cannot exalt ease of proof or adminis-
trative convenience over faithfulness to the policy language."145
The supreme court again addressed the property damage trigger in
Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great American Lloyds Insurance Co., but did
not provide any further guidance on how one determines when "actual
physical damage" occurs. 146 In that case, Great American insured Pine
Oak with consecutive one-year CGL policies from April 5, 1993 to April
5, 2001. The underlying suits involved homes that were alleged to have
been built during 1996 and 1997 and that had suffered extensive water
damage due to Pine Oak's alleged negligence. One issue in the case was
whether the allegations triggered the Great American policies.147 Focus-
ing on its decision in Don's Building, the supreme court again reiterated
that the date when the injury occurs is not "when someone happens upon
it," but 'when the damage comes to pass."1 48 The supreme court then
instructed the trial court to apply the actual-injury rule to determine
when any of the homes that were the subjects of the underlying suit suf-
fered wood rot or other physical damage.149
In Wilshire Insurance Co. v. RJT Construction, LLC, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit applied Don's Building in its analysis of
whether there was an occurrence during the policy period. 5 In that
case, Wilshire Insurance Company (Wilshire) provided RJT Construc-
tion, LLC (RJT) with CGL coverage for the period of June 2004 to June
2006. In 1999, RJT repaired the foundation of a home damaged by the
discharge of water. The homeowner sued RJT, alleging, in part, "that
cracks in the walls and ceilings suddenly appeared in his home" due to
the foundation not being level.15 During the coverage litigation, Wil-
shire argued that because there was no allegation that property damage
occurred during the policy period, it had no duty to defend. In rejecting
this argument, the Fifth Circuit noted that the alleged "cracks in the wall
and ceilings" themselves constituted the "physical damage."1 52 The
homeowner had alleged that the cracks "first" appeared in 2005 during
Wilshire's policy period. Thus, pursuant to the rule in Don's Building,
because the actual physical damage was alleged to have begun in 2005,
coverage was triggered under the policy.'5 3
As the supreme court recognized in Don's Building, determining the
"moment of injury" continues to be a difficult-if not impossible-task,
as the issue of when the injury actually occurred may not be resolved
during the underlying litigation.154 It is arguable that the "actual injury"
145. Don's Bldg., 267 S.W.3d at 29.
146. 279 S.W.3d 650, 652-53 (Tex. 2009).
147. Id. at 651-52.
148. Id. at 653 (quoting Don's Bldg., 267 S.W.3d at 22).
149. Id.
150. 581 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 2009).
151. Id. at 224.
152. Id. at 225.
153. Id.
154. Don's Bldg. Supply, Inc. v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 267 S.W.3d 20, 29-30 (Tex. 2008).
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could occur between the time when the insured begins its work until the
day that the damage becomes apparent or identifiable. The supreme
court has not yet offered any specific suggestions or recommendations for
making this determination. Therefore, litigation regarding when and
what policies may be triggered by allegations of property damage will
likely continue until courts have an opportunity to provide better gui-
dance on the issue.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE J(5) AND J(6) EXCLUSIONS
During the Survey period, the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion in Mid-
Continent Casualty Co. v. JHP Development, Inc., analyzing the scope of
the j(5) and j(6) exclusions in the standard CGL insurance policy form. 155
JHP Development, Incorporated (JHP) and TRC Condominiums, Lim-
ited (TRC) entered into a contract whereby JHP agreed to construct a
condominium project consisting of five separate units for TRC. Four of
the units were to be partially unfinished until sold to give the purchaser
the option to finish out the unit to his or her particularities.156 In 2001
and prior to the completion of the project, water intrusion problems
arose due to JHP's alleged failure to water-seal the exterior finishes. This
water intrusion caused various damage to the exterior finishes and retain-
ing walls of the units, including damage to the interior drywall, stud fram-
ing, electrical wiring, and wood flooring.'57 JHP refused to repair the
damage and complete its work on the units; thus, TRC hired another con-
tractor to repair and complete the condominiums.
Upon finishing the repairs and construction of the units, the new con-
tractor attributed $438,466.77 of the project costs towards "investigating,
demolishing, repairing, and replacing the non-defective interior finishes
and wiring that were damaged by the water intrusion."158 JHP sought
coverage for this claim from its insurer, Mid-Continent Casualty Com-
pany (Mid-Continent). Mid-Continent, however, denied coverage. After
TRC filed suit, JHP tendered the lawsuit to Mid-Continent for defense.
Again, Mid-Continent denied coverage and refused to provide a defense.
TRC subsequently took a default judgment against JHP for $1.5 mil-
lion.159 Mid-Continent then filed a declaratory judgment against JHP
and TRC, arguing that various exclusions within the policy barred cover-
age for JHP, and therefore JHP was not entitled to defense or indem-
nity.160 TRC answered and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration
155. See 557 F.3d 207 (5th Cir. 2009).




160. Id. at 210-11. Mid-Continent originally asserted that based on the allegations of
defective construction and faulty workmanship, there was no "occurrence" or "property
damage" as contemplated by the CGL policy. However, Mid-Continent abandoned this
position after the Texas Supreme Court's 2007 opinion in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Conti-
nent Casualty Co., 242 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2007). See Mid Contintent Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc.,
557 F.3d at 212 n.1.
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that no exclusions applied. Both Mid-Continent and TRC moved for
summary judgment. The district court denied Mid-Continent's motion
and granted TRC's motion. Mid-Continent appealed to the Fifth Circuit,
arguing that exclusions j(5) and j(6) applied to bar coverage for the al-
leged damages.161
Exclusion j(5) provides that insurance does not apply to property dam-
age to "[t]hat particular part of real property on which you or any con-
tractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf
are performing operations, if the 'property damage' arises out of those
operations."16 2 The parties agreed that this exclusion applies only to
property damage that occurred during JHP's ongoing operations; how-
ever, they disagreed on whether JHP was "performing operations" within
the meaning of the exclusion when the water damage occurred. TRC
argued that JHP was not performing operations because it had suspended
its operations pending the sale of the units to the individual owners. Mid-
Continent argued that construction was ongoing because JHP was still
responsible for the finish-out work on the units.
After examining the dictionary meaning of "performing operations"
and the allegations of the underlying suit, the Fifth Circuit held "that JHP
was not actively engaged in construction activities at the time the water
intrusion occurred."163 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit concluded that be-
cause JHP refused to complete the construction on the four unfinished
units, these "prolonged, open-ended, and complete suspension of con-
struction activities" did not fit into the ordinary meaning of "performing
operations," i.e., "the active performance of work."1 64 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit stated that "[a]lthough JHP intended to eventually complete
construction work once the units were sold, an actor is not actively per-
forming a task simply because he has not yet completed it but plans to do
so at some point in the future."165 Thus, exclusion j(5) did not apply,
because "JHP was not actively engaged in construction activities" when
the property damage occurred.' 66
The Fifth Circuit then analyzed the applicability of exclusion j(6). This
exclusion provides that insurance does not apply to property damage to
"[t]hat particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or
replaced because 'your work' was incorrectly performed on it."16 7 TRC
argued that the "[t]hat particular part" language limited the exclusion to
bar coverage only for the portion of the project that was the subject of
JHP's defective work. Mid-Continent argued that the exclusion in fact
provided a bar for coverage for all the damages resulting from the in-
161. Id. at 211-12.
162. Id. at 211.
163. Id. at 213.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 213-14.
167. Id. at 215.
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sured's work.1 6 8 The Fifth Circuit postured the issue:
whether the exclusion bars recovery for damage to any part of a ...
contractor's defective work, including damage to parts of the prop-
erty that were the subject of only nondefective work, or whether the
exclusion only applies to property damage to parts of the property
that were themselves the subject of the defective work.169
The Fifth Circuit noted that the "plain meaning of the exclusion" is that
damage "only to parts of the property that were themselves the subjects
of the defective work is excluded."170 According to the Fifth Circuit,
when broken down into its distinct parts, the limiting language in the ex-
clusion meant that there is coverage for damaged property that was the
subject of the insured's nondefective work and for damaged property that
the insured itself did not work on.171 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held:
[E]xclusion j(6) bars coverage only for property damage to parts of a
property that were themselves the subject of defective work by the
insured; the exclusion does not bar coverage for damage to parts of a
property that were the subject of only nondefective work by the in-
sured and were damaged as a result of defective work by the insured
on other parts of the property.172
Turning to the case at bar, the Fifth Circuit found that the damage to
the interior portions of the condominiums was not due to JHP's defective
work, but was instead due to JHP's failure to water-seal the exterior fin-
ishes and retaining walls. Thus, exclusion j(6) barred coverage for the
damage to the exterior finishes and retaining wall, but did not bar cover-
age for the damage to the interior parts of the units, including the dry-
wall, stud framing, electrical wiring, and wood flooring.'73
C. ALLEGATIONS OF FAULTY WORKMANSHIP
Another issue addressed in Pine Oak Builders, Inc. v. Great American
Lloyds Insurance Co. was whether allegations of faulty workmanship con-
stitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence" as contemplated in
a standard-form CGL policy. 174 In that case, the insurer argued that the
allegations made by the homeowners in the underlying suits against the
insured relating to improper design and faulty construction did not satisfy
the "property damage" or "occurrence" requirements of the relevant in-
surance policy.175 Noting that it had previously addressed and answered
this exact issue in Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,176
168. Id. at 214 (citing Sw. Tank & Treater Mfg. Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 243 F.
Supp. 2d 597 (E.D. Tex. 2003)).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 215.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 217.
174. 279 S.W.3d 650, 652 (Tex. 2009).
175. See id.
176. 242 SW.3d 1, 4-5, 16 (Tex. 2007).
2010] 649
SMU LAW REVIEW
the supreme court rejected the insurer's position and held that the under-
lying pleadings contained allegations of "property damage" caused by an
"occurrence." 177
VII. APPRAISAL CLAUSES
Despite the fact that standard appraisal clauses appear in most forms of
property policies, the supreme court had addressed the clause in only five
cases since 1888, and in those cases, the issues revolved around waiver or
enforceability of the clause itself.178 State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson
presented the supreme court with an issue of first impression regarding
the scope of the appraisal clause. 17 9 In that case, the insured filed a claim
with the insurer after the roof on her home was damaged by a hailstorm.
The insured's inspector found that the hail had damaged only the ridge-
line of the roof and estimated the repairs to be $499.50. The insured's
roofing contractor, however, determined that the entire roof required re-
placement at a cost of over $13,000.1so The insured demanded an ap-
praisal of the "amount of loss" pursuant to her policy, but the insurer
refused, stating that the dispute was over causation and not the "amount
of loss."181 The insured sued the insurer, seeking a judgment to compel
the insurer to submit to the appraisal. The trial court found that no ap-
praisal was warranted, and the court of appeals reversed, holding that an
appraisal was required. The insurer appealed to the supreme court to
determine whether the dispute fit within the scope of the appraisal
clause. 182
Initially, the supreme court examined the scope of the appraisal clause
with respect to damages versus liability. In 1888, the supreme court first
noted in Scottish Union & National Insurance Co. v. Clancy that a distinc-
tion exists between damage questions, which are for appraisers, and lia-
177. Pine Oak, 279 S.W.3d at 652.
178. See State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886, 888-89 (Tex. 2009) (referencing
In re Allstate County Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex. 2002); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v.
Peters, 386 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. 1965); Del. Underwriters v. Brock, 211 S.W. 779, 781
(Tex. 1919); Am. Cent. Ins. Co. v. Bass, 38 S.W. 1119, 1120 (Tex. 1897); Scottish Union &
Nat'1 Ins. Co. v. Clancy, 18 S.W. 439, 441 (Tex. 1892); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
Clancy, 8 S.W. 630, 631-32 (Tex. 1888)).
179. State Farm Lloyds, 290 S.W.3d at 889.
180. Id. at 887.
181. Id. at 887-88. The appraisal clause in the insured's policy read as follows:
APPRAISAL. If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, either one can
demand that the amount of the loss be set by appraisal. If either makes a
written demand for appraisal, each shall select a competent, disinterested ap-
praiser. Each shall notify the other of the appraiser's identity within 20 days
of receipt of the written demand. The two appraisers shall then select a com-
petent, impartial umpire .... The appraisers shall then set the amount of the
loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the
amount agreed upon shall be the amount of the loss. If the appraisers fail to
agree within a reasonable time, they shall submit their differences to the um-
pire. Written agreement signed by any two of these three shall set the
amount of the loss.
Id.
182. Id. at 888.
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bility questions, which are for the courts.183 Noting that the ordinary
meaning of the term "appraisal" is "[t]he determination of what consti-
tutes a fair price; valuation; [or] estimation of worth," the supreme court
again concluded that limiting the scope of appraisals to questions regard-
ing damages is proper.184 Thus, although the appraiser decides the
"amount of loss" under the policy, the policy itself determines whether
the insurer should pay that loss. 185
With that in mind, the supreme court turned to the issue of whether
appraisers can decide issues of causation. 186 The insurer argued in its
brief that the dispute centered not on whether the shingles were dam-
aged, but on whether the shingles were actually damaged by hail.187
Thus, according to the insurer, an appraisal was not necessary, because
the dispute revolved around whether it was actually liable for the dam-
ages. However, the supreme court noted that the insurer put forth no
evidence demonstrating that the insured's roof was damaged by anything
other than hail, nor did the insurer attempt to establish that the dispute
involved how much of the roof was damaged as opposed to how much of
the roof required replacement.188 Thus, according to the supreme court,
the trial court could not have determined if the dispute was about causa-
tion or something else.189
The supreme court further noted that a dispute over causation would
not resolve issues relating to questions of damages or liability, because
causation connects and relates to both aspects of liability and damages.190
Thus, appraisers must always initially consider causation "because setting
the 'amount of loss' requires appraisers to decide between damages for
which coverage is claimed and damages caused by everything else."191
Appraisers, however, cannot rewrite the coverage provided by the terms
of the policy, as an insured would not be responsible for paying repairs
for noncovered damages. However, to determine if appraisers have ex-
ceeded their rightful ability to determine the amount of damages depends
"on the nature of the damage, the possible causes, the parties' dispute,
and the structure of the appraisal award."192 Thus, an insurer cannot
avoid an appraisal simply because there may be a causation issue that
exceeds the scope of the appraisal.193
183. Id. at 889-90; see Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co., 8 S.W. at 631.
184. State Farm Lloyds, 290 S.W.3d at 890 (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 110 (8th
ed. 2004)).
185. Id.




190. Id. at 891-92.
191. Id. at 893.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Over the past several years, the Texas Supreme Court has issued many
opinions that have significantly changed the landscape of Texas insurance
jurisprudence, at times surprising both sides of the insurance bar with its
analysis. Opinions issued by the supreme court during this Survey period
continued to challenge established paradigms. Additionally, this Survey
period saw other Texas courts issue opinions in an attempt to apply and
interpret the recent changes to Texas insurance law established by the
Texas Supreme Court.
The coming years will be interesting as we observe how the courts react
to the apparent paradigm shift by the Texas Supreme Court. We antici-
pate that the supreme court will issue clarifying opinions in the near fu-
ture and will finally squarely address some unanswered questions. Such
issues may include: whether an insurer must demonstrate prejudice to
deny coverage under a claims-made policy based on an insured's breach
of the notice condition when the insurer does not receive notice until
after the expiration of the policy, whether Texas law recognizes any ex-
ceptions to the "eight-corners" rule in determining the duty to defend,
and how carriers insuring a mutual insured over multiple consecutive pol-
icy years will determine what policy provides indemnification for latent
property damage under the "actual injury" coverage trigger.
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